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Abstract 
This article examines the affective content of Greek media representations of the debt 
crisis, from 2009 to 2012. We analyze the content of opinion pieces from journalists, 
experts and public intellectuals published in Greek newspapers, and identify their 
affective tone towards political actors and institutions. We focus on anger, fear and 
hope, and identify blame attribution frames, which underpin the public’s trust and 
confidence in domestic and EU institutions. This article contributes to the systematic 
understanding of the impact of the debt crisis as a traumatic event on public opinion, 
and considers its implications for attitudes towards European integration.  
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Introduction 
In this article we examine the affective content of newspaper opinion pieces authored 
by Greek citizens and elites focusing on political actors and institutions during the 
debt crisis. The Greek sovereign debt crisis and economic breakdown, generated due 
to pathologies of the Greek political system (clientelism, populism, weak democratic 
institutions and civil society), and triggered by the global economic crisis, has led to 
dramatic changes in the dynamics of the Greek political and social reality and 
received extensive media coverage at home and internationally (Featherstone, 2011; 
Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis, 2011; Mouzelis and Pagoulatos, 2002; Pappas, 2013; 
Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2013; Tzogopoulos, 2013). References to ‘the 
sinking Euro’, ‘lazy Greeks’, ‘hard-working Germans’ and ‘detached Brits’ have 
frequently been hosted in headlines, news reports and editorial commentary in 
newspapers and magazines across international media outlets from 2009 onwards (e.g. 
Der Spiegel, 2011; EU Observer, 2011; Forbes, 2011; The Economist, 2011).  
The impact of this crisis on citizens and political elites has captured the attention of 
several studies, some of which use public opinion data, and others that code the 
content of relevant political communication channels. For example, Karyotis (2014) 
examines public opinion perceptions of austerity policies, while Dinas, Gemenis and 
Nezi (2014) use survey data to measure the impact of the crisis on voting behavior. 
Chalari (2014) examines subjective experiences and evaluations of citizens during the 
crisis employing interview data. Capelos and Exadaktylos (2015), and also 
Tzogopoulos (2013), study media representations of the crisis and focus on 
identifying coverage patterns and the stereotypes and preconceptions media reports 
adopt, while Exadaktylos and Zahariadis
 
(2014) discuss the crisis implications for 
political trust.  
The above studies provide valuable insights at the individual and aggregate levels of 
analysis: how citizens’ political attitudes have been shaped by the crisis, and what was 
the content of Greek media during the reporting of events. Our article sits between 
these two levels, focusing on the intermediate-level dynamics taking place between 
the individual and the aggregate, where individual opinions are circulated in the 
public domain via mass media, often setting the tone of public discussions among 
engaged citizens and elites. Looking at opinion pieces we come across elements of the 
public debate and discussion about the crisis that might influence public opinion in 
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the aggregate sense. Shoemaker and Reese (1996) propose that similar approaches 
help us understand political attitudes and shed light on the media role in society. The 
analysis of widely disseminated individual opinion pieces can point to the 
protagonists of the crisis, the concerns that surface at particular points in time, the 
evaluation of proposed solutions, and the affective pulse of public reactions, adding 
value to our understanding of the crisis and complementing the findings of standard 
surveys, interviews, as well as political communication studies that map the content of 
standard news items like headlines and news reports.  
Capturing the affective pulse of the crisis is one of our central aims. A ‘crisis’ 
signifies the emotional reaction to a problematic, disruptive, and painful situation 
(Caplan, 1974), but during the Greek crisis the affective content of citizens’ and 
elites’ considerations has largely remained understudied. Our article addresses this 
gap by offering a rigorous content analysis that identifies the emotions detected in 
opinion pieces, particularly anger, fear and hope. We discuss our findings drawing 
insights from political psychology and political economy debates that focus on how 
elites and citizens reach their judgments in times of crisis.  
As we will show, citizens and elites engage not only cognitively but also emotionally 
with the crisis and their protagonists. Their level of emotional engagement can be 
drawing on individual or social subjective experiences expressed in the singular (‘I 
feel’), or collective experiences expressed in the plural (we feel’) as shared emotions 
in actual or imagined crowds and communities (von Scheve and Salmela, 2014). 
Understanding how the key emotions of anger, fear and hope evolved over time in the 
experiences of individuals and how they featured in Greek media coverage since 2009 
can help us study more effectively the emotions expressed collectively as anger, 
frustration, and even rage in demonstrations, rallies, and other ritualized activities. 
These collective emotions which were then disseminated via social and mass media 
could have significant implications for the future of democratic values in Greece, and 
also trust in its domestic political institutions and leaders. The intense crisis context 
also fueled fears, angry protests and uncertainty in many European countries outside 
Greece, making its study relevant for understanding trust in the EU and international 
institutions more broadly. As such, our work extends research on the Greek financial 
crisis on two fronts: it sits at the intermediate political communication space of 
opinion pieces provided by citizens and political elites in reaction to the events and 
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news that covered them, and it places particular focus on the affective content of the 
crisis experiences, highlighting its psychological and political impact.  
 
Why emotions matter 
The affective side of political judgments is as valuable to the understanding of public 
opinion formation as their cognitive components. Emotions condition the way citizens 
think and act about politics, and it is impossible to completely disentangle them from 
cognitions (Marcus 2000; Ottati and Wyer, 1993). As Eagly and Chaiken (1993) point 
out, there is a symbiotic relationship between cognition and emotion: citizens often 
rationalize their emotions and their reasoning about politics generates further 
emotional reactions. Emotions have been shown to increase interest in politics 
(Marcus 2000; Graber, 1999), override self-interest, promote altruism (Sears 1993), 
affect perceptions of blame and policy evaluations (Capelos, 2010a, 2013) and 
stimulate participation (Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock, 1991).  
Certain political phenomena such as natural disasters, scandals and crises offer 
particularly interesting opportunities to study emotionality arising at the individual 
and societal level. Studies of individual affective experiences show that as citizens 
and political elites engage with a crisis, they have emotional reactions ranging from 
fear to anger to hope or empathy, which in turn stimulate political reasoning and 
action (Damasio, 1994; Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen, 2000). According to Lazarus 
(1993) a crisis involves discrete emotional reactions that are basic (anger, disgust, 
fear, anxiety, sadness) and social (shame, guilt, envy, jealousy). These emotions 
stimulate mental and physiological readiness and motivation to action for the 
individuals that experience them (Frijda, 2004). Gut-feelings—whether an event 
‘feels right’ or ‘feels wrong’—or intuitions also serve to generate political reactions 
among citizens often compensating for factual information that would promote 
abstract reasoning (Wilson, Dunn, Kraft and Lisle, 1989). Similarly to emotions, these 
decision-making pathways are not ‘purely rational’ but they are quick in establishing 
reactions to events, yet we know very little about them (Sniderman et al., 1991). 
Political psychology studies study individual emotional reactions of anger, fear and 
hope due to their distinct effects on political thinking and decision making. Anger is 
associated with lack of careful cognitive processing, rushed action, lack of attention to 
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new information and extensive use of habitual forms of decision making such as 
stereotypes. Anxiety in its mild forms is associated with investigative attention to new 
information in order to minimize the stress caused by a new situation, while as it 
escalates to fear, it is associated with the ‘flight’ mechanism, lack of action, and risk-
adverse political preferences. Hope and enthusiasm are positive emotions that 
promote the use of habitual decision making and stimulate engagement and action 
(Capelos, 2010b). Overall, studies concur that cognition, affect, motivation and action 
are interrelated (Ekman, 2004). Anxious citizens do not navigate the political space 
the same way as citizens who are angry, hopeful, ashamed or proud. Their decision 
making and also their appreciation of political events and cognitive understanding of 
developments as they unfold is conditioned by their emotionality.  
At a societal level, individuals can also have collective emotions, the feelings 
of shared pride, grief, disappointment or elation, which provide a sense of unity and 
collective experience, even to those not in physical proximity to the particular event 
that facilitated their occurrence. Naturally, these two levels of emotionality are 
interactive. Classic studies in the psychology of crowds treated collective emotions as 
contagious, seen as overriding individuals’ thoughts and feelings (Le Bon, 1896; 
McDougall, 1920), and manipulative (Canetti, 1960) while others saw their origin in 
imitation (von Scheve and Salmela, 2014). Durkheim (1912/1995) pointed to the 
collective effervescence of group rituals community and events emphasizing their 
power in coloring individuals’ beliefs and values with affective meaning. The 
relationship between collective emotions and the cultural aspects of individual 
emotions has recently inspired cross-disciplinary studies in sociology, political 
science, history, and psychology. Related concepts such as inter-group emotions, 
emotional climates, emotional communities are used to capture the contagion and 
interconnectivity of the two levels of emotional experience where the ‘us’, ‘them’ and 
‘I’ meet, and new studies in political neuroscience identify the physiological links 
between individual and collective emotions (Lamm and Silani, 2014).  
To appreciate how a crisis affects the political landscape of a country, we cannot 
sidestep the role of emotionality, both individual and collective. Stereotypes, biases, 
policy preferences, action readiness or inactivity, cynicism or engagement, have their 
root at the interaction of cognition and emotion (Frijda, Kuipers and Ter Schure, 
1989). With this in mind we focus here on the affective pulse of the Greek crisis, 
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seeing the types of emotional reactions experienced by citizens and elites and 
expressed via mass media.  
 
Mediated emotionality in crises 
 
Mass media is critical to the generation and dissemination of individual, social and 
collective emotions. As broadcast and social media cover a crisis, they also document 
and capture emotionality via their narrative and presentation of stories to individuals 
who are not physically co-present. Graber notes that news broadcasts host emotions 
which explain trends in public opinion, place mass political actions in context, and 
highlight decision-making preferences adopted by political elites (Graber, 2010). It is 
the communication of individual and social emotions in the public social space that 
turns the individual or social feelings of one person to collective affective experiences 
that stimulate cohesion, identification or alienation towards political actors and 
institutions.  
The role of media in times of crises has received attention from political 
communication scholars. Citizens rely on media to gain information about current 
developments of the crisis, identify potential solutions to problems, and also form 
opinions, stimulate their sense of political efficacy, and alleviate their stress 
originating from the complexity of the situation (Graber, 2009; Zaller, 1992). While 
most citizens use broadcast media to stay informed about politics, the readership of 
newspapers increases during crises, because they provide details, in-depth analysis 
and commentary not available in television broadcast (Graber, 2001). Familiar media 
sources, like one’s preferred newspaper, offer a safe information environment and 
host interpretations of the event by media and political elites which turn complex 
social and political issues into coherent stories (Graber, 1985; Singer and Endreny, 
1993; Walters, Wilkins and Walters, 1989).  
Opinion pieces complement the content of news items as they provide citizens with an 
idea of how experts, public intellectuals and sophisticated citizens cope with the crisis 
at a particular point in time, and allow them to solidify their own ideas and policy 
preferences. Opinion pieces provide a snapshot of public agendas and offer public 
opinion scholars that study crises the opportunity to compare them to media agendas. 
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As Everett and Dearing (1988) highlight, there are often differences between public 
agendas that reflect citizens’ perceptions of what is important and set the standards on 
the basis of which governments are often judged, media agendas that reflect the most 
extensively covered media content, and policy, or political, agendas that reflect 
decisions and actions of political elites. 
Public, media, and political agendas might be different but they are not independent 
of each other. Public perceptions of what is important are often determined by media 
agendas, so it is worth documenting and studying them in conjunction. As Wright 
(1986) notes, what citizens think is important is also affected by conversations with 
others regarding social and political issues. McLeod, Becker and Byrnes (1974) also 
note that content presented in mass media has greater effect in shaping perceptions 
among individuals who engage in interpersonal communication about the topics in the 
media agenda. This is particularly relevant for our study since opinion pieces offer 
opportunities for citizens to engage and exchange opinions about the crisis, providing 
a context that influences how people think about the crisis and who is to blame. So 
although we are not making any inference claims about how audiences interpret 
messages that appear in opinion pieces, or suggest that the analysis of opinion pieces 
offers direct insight into audience perceptions, we argue that we contribute to an 
integrated approach of understanding the media and public debate content of the 
financial crisis. By focusing on opinion pieces, our study facilitates a better 
understanding of the emotional temperature of the crisis as expressed by these 
particular media users, which enter the public mediated sphere via their opinion 
pieces.  
An additional complication is that media content is not homogeneous during a crisis. 
In the early stages, when a crisis is announced, media provide mainly information 
about the facts, and speculation about the causes of the event. Details and accounts of 
the crisis hosted in opinion pieces and elsewhere in print and broadcast media allow 
citizens to feel part of a ‘community of suffering’, seeing that their fears, worries and, 
often, misfortune is shared. As a crisis evolves, newspapers and news broadcasts 
attempt to place the situation in perspective, and provide a coherent story. Experts and 
intellectuals go beyond the facts and often provide colorful attributions of 
responsibility and emotionally arousing interpretations. And when a crisis remains in 
the media and public agenda for some time, we often see media and public officials 
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attempting to place the issue into a long-term perspective and offer suggestions on 
how to cope with the aftermath or the prolonged nature of the crisis (Graber, 2010).  
 
 
Emotions in the Greek Financial Crisis 
In a study that sets the stage for the exploration of emotionality in the Greek media 
during the crisis, Davou and Demertzis (2013) mapped the collective emotions 
available in news headlines featured in the Greek public sphere during the financial 
crisis. They highlight the negative and but also action-limiting nature of these 
emotions, expressed as collective anxiety, fear, shame and very often despair. In our 
study of opinion pieces in the Greek press we are extend this work by providing an 
overview of the individual, social and collective emotions prominent in the public 
sphere during the same period. The novelty of our work is three-fold. We aim to 
systematically capture the affective content of political communication messages at 
individual, social and collective levels. We identify their transformation or 
continuation over time. And we explain how they fit in a pattern of social affectivity 
during the crisis. Going beyond what is being said about the political events and 
actors marking the crisis, to what is being said about their emotional footprint allows 
us to get closer to the understanding of how elites and citizens experienced the 
changing political reality in hard times, and attempted to manage it in their hearts and 
minds.  
The media coverage of the Greek debt crisis in news headlines was broadly classified 
in three stages by Davou and Demertzis (2013). Their research shows that in its early 
phase (December 2009 to May 2010) the crisis was presented in print media outlets 
(with affiliations across the political spectrum) as the worst development in Greek 
history since the 1949 civil war, and headlines stressed the shock and traumatic nature 
of the crisis. In its second phase (June 2010 – December 2011), media headlines 
captured the anger and frustration of the public which was expressed in public 
demonstration and protests. During its third phase (from early 2012 onwards), Greece 
experienced a growing recession and citizens witnessed the inability of the political 
system to deal with the crisis. News headlines reflected the lack of hope, sense of 
helplessness and meaninglessness, but also a sense of gained efficacy after the results 
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of the general elections (for examples of that, please refer to Table 1, column 
‘Headlines’). It is interesting to observe in their study that the crisis overrides political 
affiliation and headlines engage in a broader debate of blame attribution in trying to 
assess the extent of the implications of the crisis for the political system. 
 
The protagonists of the crisis and who’s to blame 
 
Political actors and institutions that facilitate or constrain political action are featured 
heavily in media descriptions of events and discussions of praise or blame. Stories 
about a crisis often involve critical references to ministers, MPs, leaders of political 
parties, or parliamentary procedures, central banks and credit agencies or courts, 
financial markets, particular states, international organizations. As these agents are at 
the heart of important political developments, they become the focal point of media 
and public dialogues. We are interested here in the frequency and the affective tone of 
the representations of these agents as they carry significant weight in understanding 
how citizens understand and respond to crises.   
Blame in times of crises is spread across a number of different political actors, who 
often attempt to shift and diffuse it (Kinder and Sanders, 1990; Lasorsa and Reese, 
1990; Capelos and Wurtzer, 2009; Weaver, 1986). Vasilopoulou, Halikiopoulou and 
Exadaktylos (2014) studied parliamentary debates between Greek party leaders during 
the crisis, and found that blame was shifted around to multiple targets such as the 
party of government (PASOK), the prime minister and its ministers; the main 
opposition party (ND), its leader and MPs; external elites and actors such as the EU, 
the USA, IMF, or specific EU member states; interest groups such as banks, 
industries, corporations, or rating agencies. In our analysis, we identify the main 
agents of the crisis as they appear in opinion pieces and briefly consider the relevant 
blame frames over the same period.  
Prior to the crisis, the Greek political system was mainly a two-party system with 
government rotating between the Greek Socialists (PASOK) and the Greek 
Conservatives (Nea Dimokratia – ND). There were other political parties in 
parliament but none with significant power (Pappas, 2013). In the recent years, the 
crisis served as a catalyst to the redefinition of the political system, with the collapse 
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of PASOK’s electoral influence, the emergence of the radical left party SYRIZA as a 
contender to power, the creation of coalition governments since 2012, and the rise of 
the extreme right party of Golden Dawn in parliament (Vasilopoulou and 
Halikiopoulou, 2013). By extrapolating our results in this content analysis exercise to 
reflect the outcome of Greek elections, we can also draw some links between the 
emotional footprint of the crisis and its influence on the political behaviour of the 
electorate in the elections following the collapse of PASOK’s government and the 
emergence of populist parties within Greek parliament. 
 
Methodology and data 
Our aim was to capture individual and collective sentiments expressed through the 
statements of public opinion shapers and prominent public figures, in order to 
complement public opinion studies using survey and interview data. We conducted a 
manual content analysis of opinion pieces published in the online edition of the Greek 
newspaper To Vima from December 2009 to June 2012. This way our work unpicks 
emotionality at the starting point of the public dialogue that developed within the 
crisis. Content analysis of stories appearing within this wide timeframe allowed us to 
trace the evolution of the public debate and pinpoint the insertion of particular 
elements within the content of blame and emotions that can influence trust and 
confidence in public actors.  
Selection of newspaper 
We selected To Vima because of its moderate centrist political affiliation and it is one 
of the biggest—formerly broadsheet—newspapers in Greece in terms of circulation 
(European Journalism Centre, 2015). It is considered independent and hosts opinions 
and experts from the wider political ideological spectrum with a large variance of 
opinions.  
Using To Vima as our sample base was the best available approach. This newspaper 
sits ideologically in the middle of the political spectrum, its online edition is identical 
to its print edition, and its website offers a complete and extensive newspaper archive 
for opinion pieces and expert commentary that is easily searchable. A quick skim 
through The Vima headlines over the specified period allowed us to conclude that its 
inclusive nature and balance matches the headlines from other print media outlets 
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identified by Demertzis and Davou (2013). The online edition of the newspaper had 
roughly 4.5 million monthly visits during our time period (SimilarWeb 2015). 
 
Alternative sources were eliminated for a variety of reasons: the online version of 
Kathimerini (www.kathimerini.gr) which provided similarly convenient search 
functions were not preferred because the newspaper represents a conservative political 
line (Molokotos-Liederman, 2007). The search functions of Ta Nea (www.tanea.gr), 
Eleftherotipia (www.enet.gr ; no longer operational) and Ethnos (www.ethnos.gr) 
which are center-leaning newspapers (Lialiouti, 2015) offer only limited search 
options that do not allow the specification of commentaries and opinion pieces, and 
their online editions do not contain all content from the printed version. In addition, 
for the time period at stake other newspapers did not host a large number of opinion 
pieces but included mostly editorials and commentary from their own columnists. For 
the reasons noted above, while we recognize the limited range of our sample, we 
believe that our study provides a solid starting point for further analysis of opinion 
pieces in Greek newspapers.  
A search of the newspaper’s online index using the keyword ‘German*’ (‘Γερμαν*’) 
between December 2009 and July 2012 yielded a large number of hits which were 
then assessed for relevance to the Greek debt crisis. We used this search term because 
Germany was identified by opinion polls and other academic studies as the ‘enemy 
country’ in Greek perceptions of the crisis, and references to Germany were likely to 
contain references to the crisis and affective content. Permanent editorial columns, 
reproductions of foreign source articles and irrelevant material were excluded from 
the coding.  
 
Sampling 
Instead of a census (selecting all units) we sampled around six time points, expanding 
on the three stages of the Greek crisis analyzed by Davou and Demertzis (2013): 
December 2009, May 2010, June 2010, November 2011, May 2012 and June 2012). 
We identified these six points on the basis of important pieces of controversial 
legislation being brought forward to Parliament, the crucial decisions made at the 
European Union level, the specific actions by the government and other public actors, 
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and the animated civil society mass reactions. We expected interesting variations in 
the emotional content of opinion pieces to be clustered around these dates following 
the public pulse for political analysis of ongoing events.  
The first three instances include the unravelling of the crisis in Greece (December 
2009), the signing of the first bailout agreement (Memorandum of Understanding) in 
May 2010, and the protests and public demonstrations that followed (June 2010). 
December 2009 marks a month when the international credit rating agencies began 
downgrading the lending credibility of the country following the announcements of 
the extensive public debt and deficit (see for example, Almunia 2009). The first 
bailout agreement marks a significant event as it demarcates effectively the beginning 
of austerity in Greece as well as the emergence of a pro-bailout/anti-bailout cleavage. 
The first tough austerity measures of the memorandum led to considerable reaction by 
the Greek public independent of political affiliation in June 2010 (Vasilopoulou et al., 
2014). During this time we anticipate a concentration of opinion pieces on perceptions 
of the crisis, rather than solutions. We anticipate generalized statements about 
corruption, patronage, easy money and state benefits. During this time we also expect 
to find a strong demarcation of ‘them’ versus ‘us’ in the way media stories discuss the 
events, which can have implications for public policy-making. In the context of the 
other three occasions (November 2011, May 2012 and June 2012) external pressures 
for reform are expected to receive more coverage. The Greek threat to hold a 
referendum over the sovereign debt bailout took place in November 2011, followed 
by debates about scenarios for a potential EU exit. This is the first time that we have a 
‘Grexit’ scenario (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2013). In light of this threat, the 
consecutive elections that took place in May and June 2012 marked the end of a two-
party system in Greece and the shrinking of the popular base of PASOK, thus 
signifying an important turn in the Greek political system. During this period we 
expect external perceptions of domestic political elites to penetrate the political debate 
reflecting priorities beyond policy implementation—including moves towards saving 
face in respect to international partners. 
For each time point we used all the relevant pieces appearing in the first and third 
week of each month, from Monday to the following Monday. Selecting by week, 
rather than using the full universe of pieces for each month allowed us to work with 
an economic sample which at the same time allows for sufficient breadth. This 
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sampling method is considered to provide optimum results (Riffe, Lacy and Ficco, 
1998). This resulted in a stratified composite sample of 69 opinion pieces (44,388 
words in total), with most being around 437 words and ranging from 7 to 1759 words. 
Because automatic coding systems do not work with Greek language text, and 
computer translations are not reliable for capturing emotionality, charged language, 
and the context of particular content, the articles were coded manually to identify 
emotion words that expressed individual, social and collective emotions, as well as 
the political actors and institutions featured heavily in the presentation of the crisis 
and the assignment of blame, per each time point. We designed an electronic coding 
sheet where data was entered directly into the computer system, two coders engaged 
in pre-coding training, pilot-coded six articles (one from each time point) to ensure 
consistency in coding approach, and re-briefed regularly to ensure clarity and 
consistency in instructions and coding decisions. Our codebook contains a list of 
variables measuring the opinion piece prominence (page number), size (length of 
entry in words), and tonal qualities of the article overall (positive, negative or neutral). 
Overall tone was assessed on the basis of the total number of positive and negative 
references within each piece. For example, references to pride were considered 
positive and irony was considered negative. When an opinion piece contained a large 
proportion of positive over negative references, it was coded as positive. When it 
contained a large proportion of negative over positive references it was coded as 
negative and when the number of positive and negative mentions was balanced, it was 
coded as mixed. 
Turning to specific emotional language we used six broad emotion categories to 
capture expressed emotionality (without making here a distinction of whether it was 
individual, social or collective): anger (also containing references to rage, fury, 
disgust, frustration), anxiety (references to fear, worry, alarm, threat, panic, terror, 
nervousness, pressure), disappointment (references to depression, misery, sadness, 
despair, pessimism, desperation), uncertainty (references to ambivalence and 
hesitation), shame (also humiliation, guilt) and hope (references to courage, 
excitement, determination).   
We were also interested in the presentation and protagonists of the crisis. To assess 
whether the opinion pieces had a domestic (Greece only) or international focus, we 
kept track of the number of references to Greece, Germany, France, Spain and other 
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countries. To get a picture of which actors occupy the central stage in public debate, 
we kept an account of the types (individuals, organizations) and names of political 
actors mentioned, which we then classified in domestic political leaders, domestic 
political parties, government, EU actors, political elites broadly, interest and social 
groups, press and the media, and finally foreign investors and markets. We also 
recorded blame attributions towards political agents, adopting a truncated version of 
the typology of Vasilopoulou et al. (2014). Instead the original nine classifications of 
party of government; main opposition party; both of the above; lesser opposition; 
external elites; specific interest groups; all parties in the system; party of government 
and main opposition party and external elites combined; party of government and 
main opposition party combined with specific interest groups (p.393). We used the 
following broader and truncated categories: the political system in general, the 
government, the opposition, interest groups, domestic and external institutions. 
Quantitative analysis was then carried out on the collected data.  
We are confident that the above steps provide us with useful data that allow us to map 
the emotional content and framing with regards to the actors operating within the time 
period, while ensuring validity and replicability. Our methodological thoroughness 
allows for a high level of generalizability, although do not have the ambition to offer a 
full account of the Greek debt crisis, make deterministic assertions regarding the 
emotional framing and the outcomes of the crisis, or engage in investigating 
motivations or political agendas.  
 
Analysis and findings: unweaving the web of passions and blame 
The tone of the opinion pieces we analyzed was mostly mixed (61%), containing both 
positive and negative references and arguments. About 30% of the opinion pieces 
were pessimistic and 9% were optimistic that the crisis would be favorably resolved. 
Turning to the specific emotional content of the opinion pieces, we found that the 
discussion of the Greek debt crisis is loaded with emotion words denoting mainly 
anxiety (39%) and anger (36%) expressed at various levels, from moderate to high. In 
addition we identified expressed shame (15%); disappointment (7%); uncertainty 
(4%), but also modest hope (16%).   
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Emotion words pointing to anxiety and fear appeared at a slowly increasing rate 
throughout the period we examined, starting with 11% during December 2009 and 
May 2010, and continued at 19% during June 2012, where fear-related references 
reached 22%. This is in line with emotional reactions of the public during this time 
period when anxiety regarding the Greek debt was most prominent (Davou and 
Demertzis, 2013). Fear of the unknown is featured in opinion pieces, especially in 
relation to the future of the country in the EU and in the run-up to the two elections.  
Interestingly, emotional reactions that point to anger started a bit later, in May 2010, 
and escalated faster, often reaching levels of fury and rage, during June 2010 (32%) 
and November 2011 (36%). This can be linked to the first attempt to implement 
austerity measures affecting previously favored social groups spreading to other 
targeted populations, which in turn led to the protests of May 2010. Following the 
violent protests and the death of three people in the burning building of a bank in June 
2010 marked a turn of anger to fury and rage, towards the handling of the incident by 
the government, and fueled by smaller opposition parties. By November 2011, rage 
was pointed towards the Prime Minister and PASOK’s actions, and the public called 
for his resignation.  
Uncertainly and ambivalence concentrated in December 2009 (67%) and November 
2011 (33%) when we also see the majority of shame-related references (50%). This 
can be attributed to the damaged image of the country internationally and linked to the 
imported stereotypical discourse that we mentioned above. Disappointment, sadness 
or expressed depression, were also expressed in the early stages, particularly during 
May 2010 (60%). Traces of uplifting emotions like hope were found from May 2010 
(18%) and November 2011 (9%) onwards, and reached their height in May 2012 
(46%). These moments in time were marked by pockets of breathing space provided 
by the bailout money (May 2010), the renewed hope in a cooperation government 
(November 2011) and the optimism for a wider coalition of political forces in May 
2012. By June 2012 however, hope references dropped to 27%. While this is a serious 
drop, it shows the preservation of some optimism following the agreement on a 
coalition government across three political parties and the promise for renegotiation 
of the bailout terms and the easing of austerity measures. We visually present the 
above in Graph 1.  
*** Please insert Graph 1 here *** 
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We get a fuller appreciation of the content of emotional reactions when we review 
emotion terms as they appeared every month. In December 2009 we see references to 
affective reactions of being ‘alert’, and feeling ‘anxiety’, ‘uncertainly’ and 
‘hesitation’. By May 2010, the emotions expressed were ‘uncertainty’, ‘alarm’, 
‘anxiety’, ‘anger’, ‘rage’, ‘despair’, ‘disappointment’, ‘pessimism’, ‘misery’, but also 
occasionally ‘hope’, ‘courage’, and ‘excitement’. In June 2010 we came across 
emotional reactions pointing to ‘anger’, ‘frustration’, ‘revenge’, ‘anxiety ‘, 
‘nervousness’, ‘fear’, ‘pessimism’, ‘depression’ and ‘despair’. November 2011 was 
equally marked by ‘anger’, ‘rage’, ‘fury’, ‘uncertainty’, ‘anxiety’, ‘fear’ ‘ 
humiliation’, but also featured attempts of social and political detachment expressed 
as ‘cynicism’, counterbalanced by traces of ‘hope’ and ‘excitement’. May 2012 
brought ‘ambivalence’, ‘guilt’, ‘anger’, ‘hate’, ‘anxiety’ ‘threat’, ‘worry’, ‘fear’, 
‘panic’, ‘terror’ but also ‘hope for survival’ and ‘hope for a better Greece’. The 
following month, June 2012, feeling ‘pressure’, ‘humiliation’, ‘insecurity’, and 
‘anxiety’, ‘fear’ that became ‘desperation’, ‘disgust’, ‘hate’, ‘rage’, and ‘terror’ were 
occasionally interrupted and infused by positive emotions of ‘hope’ and 
‘determination’. These emotional reactions follow the political developments and 
demonstrate that public discourse rides the spirit of the times.  
An analysis of the affective echo of the Greek debt crisis cannot omit a review of the 
multiple political and social, national and international actors and institutions featured 
in the opinion pieces. Interestingly, only 9% of the cases examine the Greek debt 
crisis as a national-only matter and the majority of articles feature references to 
Germany, France, Spain, Italy and other countries. Interestingly, 16% of the articles 
focused exclusively on Germany, in line with the argument made by Bee and Chrona 
(2013) that the bailout agreement was perceived as a German-style occupation in 
Greece and the protests of June 2010 placed Germany in center-stage for the Greek 
predicament. France was also mentioned, but mainly in the later stages of the crisis, 
following the election of François Hollande as French president. He was perceived as 
someone who could control the advent of German austerity in Europe, thus renewing 
hope according to the opinion pieces. Spain, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, the USA are also 
occasionally mentioned.  
Turning to the focus of the opinion pieces we see that it was not monotonous or 
single-focused. Rather, most opinion pieces included references to a number of social 
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and political actors and institutions. For example, mentions of domestic political 
leaders appeared 38% of the time, domestic political parties were discussed 28% of 
the time, and the government was mentioned 20% of the time. EU Actors (17%), 
Interest and Social groups (17%), Political Elites (16%), Press and Media (16%), 
Foreign Investors and Markets (12%) were also mentioned.  
The focus on specific actors is not homogenous across the six time points we 
analyzed. In fact, the majority of references to political leaders were in June 2010 and 
November 2011 (both at 28%). During these times, public opinion was demanding for 
the leaders of the two major parties in Greek parliament (PASOK and ND) to reach 
some sort of compromise regarding the implementation of the bailout measures (June 
2010) and the consolidation of a cooperation government in November 2011. 
References to political parties appeared in 21% of the coded articles in May 2010 
when the bailout agreement was ratified, and increased to 32% by November 2011 
during the formation of a cooperation government. References to parties peaked in 
May 2012, appearing in 37% of the articles, as the first round of national elections 
took place. The majority of references to Government appear in December 2009 and 
November 2011 (both 29%) and also June 2010 (21%) following the social unrest and 
violent protests against the bailout agreement. Emphasis on EU actors was at its 
highest in December 2009 and November 2011 (25%) as public and media attention 
was placed on the EU to resolve the Greek debt crisis by agreeing on a bailout 
(December 2009) and then dealing with the prospect of a referendum for the second 
bailout agreement in Cannes (November 2011). References to interest and other 
social groups gradually increased as the crisis unfolded. It peaked at 33% in May 
2012, reflecting the protests that took place and the attempts of political parties to 
capitalize on the vulnerability of affected by the crisis citizens seeking political gains 
(Davou and Demertzis, 2013). Political elites were featured mostly in November 
2011 (18%) and peaked in May and June 2012 (both at 27%) reflecting the 
deliberations to form a coalition government. The role of the media was most 
prominently discussed during the first phase of the crisis, reaching 27% in December 
2009 and May 2010, focusing on the reporting style of media organizations (both 
domestic and international), their responsibility in informing their audiences and 
framing the crisis. Foreign investors and markets were mostly discussed in December 
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2009 (50%) and then November 2011 (25%), reflecting lack of confidence in the 
Greek program and/or proposed European resolution.  
Finally we were interested in examining blame shifting strategies in the context of the 
crisis. As we show on Graph 2, blame attribution is spread across several actors: the 
political system, the government, interest groups, and domestic and external 
institutions received blame between 30-35% of the time. The opposition was blamed 
less frequently, about 20% of the time. In addition, blame was not evenly spread over 
time. Characteristically, the government was blamed the most in December 2009, 
June 2010 and November 2011, while the opposition was mainly blamed in May 2010 
and November 2011. The government was held accountable for requesting the bailout 
and responding to protest, while the opposition was held accountable for its 
unwillingness to take responsibility for the bailout ratification and negotiating the 
terms of participating in a cooperation government. The political system in general 
received the majority of its blame references in May 2012 reflecting its inability to act 
due to its high fragmentation.  
*** Please insert Graph 2 here *** 
The timeline of combined information on emotionality references, public agenda 
focus, protagonists of blame from our study are listed in Table 1, matched with the 
newspaper headlines from Davou and Demertzis (2013), allowing for a clearer picture 
of the emotional footprint of the crisis on Greek society. The second column 
highlights the tense emotional content of opinion pieces; columns three and four point 
to the political actors and agents falling in and out of blame focus as time progressed; 
and column five presents a selection of headlines as listed in Davou and Demertzis 
(2013).  
*** Please insert Table 1 here *** 
Three important observations can be made here. First, the emotions accounted for in 
the opinion pieces track closely the affective content of newspaper headlines, pointing 
to the interactive nature of public and media agendas. Second, agents and actors with 
most mentions in each month are often the ones that receive public blame, showing 
how developments and events during the crisis weave a complex pattern of 
responsibility in public perceptions. Third, the debates in opinion pieces appear to be 
19 
 
multi-focused, pointing to the complexity of the issue and its appreciation by those 
who engage in political discussions.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The analysis of the emotional content of opinion pieces in the context of the financial 
crisis provides valuable insights on how opinion shapers, public intellectuals and 
citizens discussed and responded to the unfolding events, and complements public 
opinion and media content studies of the crisis. Negative perceptions of the crisis 
were associated with anger, fear and also hope at its different stages, following 
closely particular political developments. These emotional reactions were in line with 
the general sentiment captured by the analysis of newspaper headlines of Davou and 
Demertzis (2013). The commentary featured in opinion pieces highlighted the human 
impact and societal implications of the crisis, and involved a number of political 
actors and institutions. Attributions of blame rested more heavily on government and 
prominent international actors rather than the opposition. Vasilopoulou et al. (2014) in 
their analysis of parliamentary rhetoric found that when politicians shifted blame, 
government and opposition were equally targeted. Here we see that the focus of 
public attention and appetite for justice zoom in on the power holders, the incumbents 
and international actors that feature prominently in the media. This can be explained 
by the avenging or retributive nature of opinion pieces that criticized the structural 
side of the Greek debt crisis, focusing on the power-holders (Capelos and 
Exadaktylos, 2015). On the other hand, political leaders’ speeches in the same period 
demonstrated strong exclusivity as they effectively adopted a partisan approach of 
blame-shifting (Vasilopoulou et al. 2014). This is an important finding as it illustrates 
that the political opposition in Greece was not identified as a front-stage player.  
At the juncture of emotions and cognition lies the feeling of institutional, political and 
social trust. In the case of the Greek debt crisis, citizens’ already low trust towards the 
national government as well as financial and political institutions of the EU and its 
future has been put to a hard test (Davou and Demertzis, 2013). The financial 
hardships, newly introduced taxation and the implementation of more and harsher 
austerity measures are the obvious suspects. Outlying the affective ‘footprint’ of the 
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crisis allows us to think more about how trust towards internal and external actors and 
institutions can be restored (Hetherington, 2004). Anger, fear and hope affect 
appraisals and have different behavioral consequences. Initiatives to stimulate trust 
towards formal and informal political institutions both at the domestic and the 
European level will fail unless they understand and successfully address citizens’ 
emotionality.  
An extension of this research involves the analysis of citizens’ reactions and 
comments to the opinion pieces we coded. Online opinions allow readers to offer their 
own response and express their views, thus providing an open forum for public debate 
and potentially stimulate political learning and engagement. Coding the content of this 
communication feedback loop could provide us with valuable insights into a parallel 
discourse path: the way ordinary citizens engage with the causes, consequences, and 
key players of the financial crisis, as well as the media presentation of the events. 
This, in turn could help us understand even better the multi-dimensional character of 
public attitudes towards the proposed and implemented strategies and measures to 
tackle the crisis.  
An equally interesting project to build on the present study would involve the 
systematic analysis of the affective content of public opinion polls, political rhetoric, 
media headlines, opinion pieces, blogs and other online communication forums in the 
Greek public arena. Comparing media, political, and public agendas would offer 
public opinion scholars that study the financial crisis a fuller appreciation of the 
public dialogue that different agents deploy in difficult times. Concentrating on their 
affective content would allow us insight into the long lasting effects of the crisis. 
Borrowing the famous words of Maya Angelou, people can forget what you said and 
did, but will never forget how you made them feel (Kelly, 2003).   
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Appendix 
 
Graph 1: Variations of Emotional Reactions during the Greek Debt Crisis 
 
 
Note: Cross-tabulation analysis. Data points represent % of emotion words appearing 
each month  
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Graph 2: Blame attribution dynamics during the Greek Debt Crisis 
 
 
Note: Data points represent % blame per actor in opinion pieces for each time point.  
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Table 1: Timeline of emotionality, protagonists of blame and newspaper headlines  
 
Dates Emotions Public Agenda Focus Protagonists of  Blame Headlines 
December 
2009  
‘alert’, ‘anxiety’, 
‘uncertainly’, ‘hesitation’ 
Government (29%) 
 
EU Actors (25%) 
 
Media (27%) 
 
Foreign investors and markets 
(50%) 
Government (23%) 
 
Interest groups (23%) 
‘Nightmarish Report on 
Social Security’ (Typos tis 
Kiriakis) 
 
‘The market suffocates’ (I 
Chora) 
May 2010  ‘uncertainty’, ‘alarm’, 
‘anxiety’, ‘anger’, ‘rage’, 
‘despair’, ‘disappointment’, 
‘pessimism’, ‘misery’, 
‘hope’, ‘courage’, 
Political parties (21%) 
 
Media (27%) 
Political system (21%) 
 
Opposition (29%) 
 
‘Hunger and misery for 
salaried employees and 
pensioners’ (Avriani) 
 
29 
 
‘excitement’ Interest groups (23%) ‘People at the Guillotine’ (24 
Hours) 
 
‘In vain Sacrifice’ (I Vradyni) 
 
‘Suffocation for five stony 
years’ (Ethnos) 
 
June 2010 ‘anger’, ‘frustration’, 
‘revenge’, ‘anxiety’, 
‘nervousness’, ‘fear’, 
‘pessimism’, ‘depression’ 
‘despair’ 
Government (21%) 
 
Political leaders (28%) 
 
 
Government (23%) 
 
Political system (25%) 
 
External actors (30%) 
‘Blood and Tears for 100 bns’ 
(Ta Nea) 
 
‘Four-year Tax Nightmare’ 
(Eleftherotypia) 
 
‘Coup de Grace to Salaried 
Employees and Pensioners’(I 
30 
 
Vradyni) 
 
‘Massacre against the Greek 
People’ (Rizospastis) 
 
‘Panic’ (Democratia) 
 
November 
2011  
‘anger’, ‘rage’, ‘fury’, 
‘uncertainty’, ‘anxiety’, 
‘fear’, ‘ humiliation’, ‘hope’, 
‘excitement’ 
Government (29%) 
 
Political leaders (28%) 
 
Political parties (32%) 
 
EU Actors (25%) 
 
Government (23%) 
 
Opposition (29%) 
 
Domestic & external actors 
(36%) 
‘Gate of Hell’ (Democratia) 
 
‘Prince of Chaos’ 
(Eleftherotypia) 
 
‘Political Thriller’ 
(Aggelioforos) 
 
‘Earthquake in Europe’ 
31 
 
Political elites (18%) 
 
Foreign investors and markets 
(25%) 
(Avriani) 
 
‘Blackmail’ (Eleftheros 
Typos) 
 
May 2012  ‘ambivalence’, ‘guilt’, 
‘anger’, ‘hate’, ‘anxiety’ 
‘threat’, ‘worry’, ‘fear’, 
‘panic’, ‘terror’, ‘hope for 
survival’, ‘hope for a better 
Greece’ 
Political parties (37%) 
 
Interest groups (33%) 
 
Political elites (27%) 
Political system (29%) 
 
Interest groups (23%) 
 
Domestic & external actors 
(36%) 
 
‘People’s Rage: Change the 
Memorandum’ (Eleftheros 
Typos) 
 
‘Thriller’ (I Vradyni) 
 
‘Black Dawn’ (Ethnos) 
 
June 2012  
 
 ‘pressure’, ‘humiliation’, 
‘insecurity’, ‘anxiety’, ‘fear’ 
‘desperation’, ‘disgust’, 
External actors (27%) 
 
External actors (27%) 
 
‘The Collaborators of Troika 
Kill Cancer-Patients’ 
(Avriani) 
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‘hate’, ‘rage’, ‘terror’, ‘hope’, 
‘determination’ 
Domestic & external actors 
(23%) 
 
Political elites (27%) 
Domestic & external actors 
(23%) 
 
‘Drama’ (Democratia) 
Note: Percentages in Public Agenda Focus and Protagonists of Blame columns represent frequency of mentions within each specific category. 
Selection of headlines from Davou and Demertzis (2013).
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